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The fuel subsidy patchwork in Nigeria has been fraught with elite manipulations and intrigues. This paper analyses the 
debilitating state of Nigeria’s energy-dependent economy against the backdrop of unprecedented oil-generated opulence. The 
article relies on secondary data. This method enabled the author draw heavily on recorded data thus making for an in-depth 
analysis. It was found that rampant corruption in the nation’s sprawling oil sector is hugely responsible for the intractable 
economic development slow-motion that has worsened the plight of ordinary Nigerians. While the country’s refineries remain 
moribund, fuel subsidy has, instead created leeway for the criminally-minded elite to squander the commonwealth. Government 
has demonstrated little or no political will to stem the decay in the oil sector, as underlined by her reluctance to prosecute oil 
thieves, some of whom are directly or indirectly connected to the apparatus of the state. Unlike in Ghana where government 
engaged the people and introduced measures to cushion the harsh effects of fuel subsidy phase-out on the poor, in Nigeria, 
government has often increased the cost of petrol before ever addressing its impacts on vulnerable groups. The paper 
therefore recommends the revamping of the country’s refineries, the strengthening of the fight against corruption and the 
establishment of a regulatory framework to protect citizens as necessary measures to help improve the poor state of Nigeria’s 
economy and society. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Discourses on oil are controversial globally. The Nigerian case is not an exception.  Whilst crude oil remains a 
predominant source of energy and wealth for the global economy, its discovery in Nigeria has led to the negation of 
agriculture, which ab initio employed 75% of the population and contributed over 80% to GDP. Today, Nigeria is reliant on 
oil for about 99% of its foreign exchange earnings (Aghalino, 2006). She is the world’s 14th largest producer of crude oil 
with the 10th largest proven natural gas reserves. The country has four refineries with an installed produciton capacity of 
445,000 barels of fuel per day, adequate enough to meet its domestic needs with a surplus for export (CCPA, 2012). 
The above statistics would suggest the formidable potentials of the Nigerian economy. On the contrary however, 
she remains a large net importer of gasoline and other petroleum products and continues to rank low in human 
development indicators. Harsh economic realities and frequent world oil price fluctuations prompted the introduction of 
subsidies in Nigeria’s energy sector in the mid 1980s. Something of a creeping phenomenon, the value of the subsidies 
has gone from 1 Billion in the 1980s to over 6 Billion Dollars in 2011 (CPPA, 2005). 
The maintenance of fuel subsidy in Nigeria is said to have led to a situation whereby the commodity became much 
cheaper in Nigeria ($0.44 per litre) compared to neighbouring countries like Benin ($1.04), Niger ($1.07), Cameroon 
($1.2) and Chad ($1.32). Accordingly, it was concluded that large subsidies led to petroleum products smuggling to 
neighbouring countries and stagnated economic development (Africa’s Pulse, 2012). Driven by institutions of global 
governance – the IMF, World Bank and other Donor agencies, successive Nigerian governments suddenly became 
determined to phase-out subsidies in consonance with the harsh economic realities of the times (Okogu, 1993). 
Over the past decades, the oil subsidy patchwork has been allegedly bedevilled by criminal tendencies of oil 
importers and sharp practices in the distribution of import allocation, approval of subsidy payments and actual release of 
subsidy cheques. In Nigeria, more than 25 oil marketers have been indicted to face criminal charges and a host of other 
marketers that have benefitted from fuel import subsidies are said to be statutorily unqualified to import fuel as they were 
not licensed to carry out any form of business in Nigeria (Oshunkeye, 2012). 
National Assembly investigation into how subsidy has been operated revealed “the crooked manner fuel subsidy 
has been shared amongst oil marketers and the appalling inefficiency and corruption in the Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation” (Aghedo, 2012:16). Clearly, subsidy has basically benefitted oil cabals, including MNOCs that are not 
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interested in building refineries or transforming the poor state of the Nigerian economy. 
The succint objective of the paper is therefore to examine the impact of fuel subsidy corruption on Nigeria’s 
economic trajectory. To achieve this, the paper is divided into six basic sections: Section one elucidates on the 
Conceptual and theoretical perspective, Section two looks at the state and oil in Nigeria, Section three attempts a 
historicisation of the fuel subsidy framework in Nigeria, Section four considers the case for and against subsidy phase-out 
in Nigeria, Section five discusses corruption in Nigeria’s oil sector, and Section Six neats the work together in the form of 
conclusions and recommendations. 
 
2. Conceptual Net 
 
A subsidy as stipulated by the OECD in a study is basically government action that decreases the consumption price of 
the consumer and or increases the setting price of the producer (UNEP, 2003). It is any measure that keeps the prices 
consumers pay for a good or product below market levels for consumers or for producers. A subsidy is a deliberate 
attempt by the government to support a chosen economic agent – a consumer and a producer and it can be applied in 
any market that involves the buying and selling of products and or services (CPPA, 2012). 
The most featured type of subsidies tends to be agricultural and energy related. Energy subsidies and particularly 
fuel subsidies have a long history and have been applied in different forms with differing outcomes internationally 
(Adebiyi, 2011). It is estimated that more than 25 African countries reportedly had one form of energy subsidy or another 
before 2010-2011, which consumed an average of 1.4 percent of GDP in public resources (Coady, et al., 2010). 
Corruption is any action or inaction of any person or group (public or private) deliberately perpetrated to secure 
advantage for oneself, a relation, associate or group(s) in a manner that detracts from the acceptable regulations, morals 
and or ethical standards or code thereby constituting a travesty of justice, equity and fair play (Ofoeze, 2004). It is a 
multifaceted phenomenon that ranges from giving and accepting of bribes to other kinds of fraudulent practices. 
It can also be seen as the non-violent criminal and illicit activities committed with the objective of earning wealth 
illegally either individually or in a group or organized manner, thereby violating existing legislations governing the 
economic activities of government and its administration. Corruption is endemic almost in every sector in Nigeria and is at 
the root of poverty and underdevelopment in the country 
 
3. Theoretical Synergy 
 
A central premise of the classical elite theory is that in every society, a minority makes the major political and economic 
decisions. The origins of this theory are traceable to Plato, but its elaboration is in the thoughts of two Italian political 
sociologists, Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca (Chilcote, 1994). At the heart of this theory is a clear presumption of the 
average citizen’s inadequacies. As a consequence, democratic systems supposedly rely on the wisdom, loyalty and 
acumen of their political leaders, not on the population at large (Walker, 1966). 
Based on the theoretical stipulations of elitism, the political system is structured into two groups; the few who lead, 
that is the elite, and the many who follow, the masses. The elite possess ideological commitments and manipulative skills 
which makes them suitable for leadership responsibilities, whilst the masses or the “apolitical clay” are a much larger 
category of passive, inert followers who have both little knowledge and less influence in public affairs. Pareto divides the 
elite into the governing elite (those who directly or indirectly govern) and non-governing elite (the rest of the elite who are 
not in government). 
The crux of the elite theory, which in a precis, supposes that the game of politics is about elite domination and 
manipulation epitomizes the scenario in Nigeria’s oil sector. More than anything else, oil cartels/cabals in collaboration 
with the political elite have engaged in a sustained campaign of squandering the commonwealth (Daily Independent, 
2006; Okogu, 1993), further, corruption in the oil sector has been linked directly or indirectly to institutions of the state, 
thereby making it complicit in the rot and decay that pervades the sector. 
Government’s inability or refusal to probe the apalling corruption in the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
(NNPC), coupled with its unwillingness to prosecute suspected oil thieves (who undoubtedly, fall within the non-governing 
elite stratum) is a pointer to the fact that its officials are enmeshed in the wanton corruption in the sector or at least are 
beneficiaries of it. The fight against corrupt individuals/groups seems to have attenuated in Nigeria in recent years, and 
government has demonstrated a glaring unwillingness to investigate corruption-related cases especially in the country’s 
sprawling oil sector.  The masses who ideally, should be benefactors of the country’s oil wealth continue to suffer in 
pernury and helplessness on account of government’s tempered response to corruption, which continues to exacerbate 
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the poor state of the country’s economy and society. 
 
4. The State and Oil in Nigeria 
 
Onuh (1983) describes the oil sector as the most dynamic sector in Nigeria and the development of the oil sector as the 
most significant event in recent years.  Indeed, oil has significantly shaped the nature of the Nigerian state. The various 
ways in which it has shaped the political economy of the state has been described by Turner (1978) as one involving the 
compradors and state elites. Jeyifo (2009) alludes to this when he observed that Nigeria’s political economy is 
underpinned by oil, which is the basis of its insertion into the global capitalist system. 
It is noteworthy that Nigeria has been described as a rentier state in the literature on politics and development 
(Akhaine, 2010; Frynas, 1998; Etete, 1995; Khan, 1994). The state collects rents from sales of oil and these are merely 
distributed through the bureaucratic mill where they are appropriated, missappropriated and siphoned. Local participation 
in the oil production process is negligible, which explains the dependency on expatriates in the sector and the country’s 
continuing reliance on imports of refined oil into the country, to the detriment of her current account balance. 
Political scientists glibly remark that politics is about the state and what it does. This assertion has continued to 
vindicate itself in both advanced and peripheral socio-economic formations (Akhaine, 2010). Not even the vaunting of 
globalization with its “roll back” mantra has been able to tame the state. Nowhere else can the politics of oil be 
understood better than in the state’s relations to the oil industry, the oil owning communities and the general citizenry. 
Apart from the oil majors with whom it is in patnership, the state allocates oil blocks on the basis of patronage or 
political considerations (Nwachukwu and Chike; Okogu, 2005), and oil theft, also known as illegal bunkering is 
perpetrated by persons connected to the apparatus of the state (Daily Independent, 2006). The Ogomudia special 
security committee referred to them as a “Cartel or Mafia” composed of highly placed and powerful individuals within 
society. These powerful persons include a few criminally minded former military personnel (Jeyifo, 2009). 
Local consumption of refined oil products such as petroleum, kerosene and diesel has been influenced by the 
imaginary economics known as fuel subsidy (Akhaine, 2010).  Often driven by agencies of global governance such as the 
IMF and the World Bank, it has continued to fuel circles of inflation in an economy in which the informal sector is 
preponderant. Disagreements over the appropriate derivation formula stalemated the 2005 National Political Conference 
that sought to address critical national questions plaguing the federation. 
The dynamics of oil exploration and exploitation in Nigeria has been undermined by panoply of legal frameworks 
such as the Petroleum Act of 1969 which vests the entire ownership of all petroleum in the state.  The land use decree of 
1978 also vests land ownership in the state (Myers, 1991; Mabogunje, 2009). In 2003, the controversial onshore/offshore 
dichotomy sought to further increase the state’s control of oil resources. The 13% derivation enshrined in the 1999 
constitution and the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) with promises of a new fiscal regime of transparency and accountability 
in the oil sector, reduced the incentives for conflict with oil-owning communities. 
The importance of oil in Nigeria is such that we can in fact talk about the permeability of oil in ways in which 
Senator Charles W.Tobey conceived of it in the American context: ‘Oil permeates a great deal of our life; it permeates the 
halls of legislatures; it permeates the congress’ (Atiri, 2012:17). Interestingly, in the last few decades, Nigeria has made 
over US $500 billion dollars from oil, but this has not transformed the fortunes of its citizenry, as the earnings are in the 
hands of a small percentage of the population who have largely embezzled it (Akhaine, 2010). This is perhaps why 
Lubeck, Watts and Lipschutz (2007) citing Ross opined that: 
Nigeria offers an archetypal example of the paradox of oil by which vast oil wealth begets extravagant corruption, 
deep poverty, polarized income distributions and poor economic performance.  
 
5. Fuel Subsidy in Nigeria: A Historical Overview  
 
Petroleum has fed the Nigerian State since production started in commercial quantities in the 1960s. The initial corollary 
was increased government revenue, robust foreign resources, strong currency and high standard of revenue (Nordhaus, 
1973). However, the oil boom experience since the 1960s has led to major increases in oil prices of petroleum products, 
resulting in huge dependence on oil revenue for basic infrastructural projects in the country. The adoption of a Structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAP) threw the system of relative prices out of balance.  Among the prescriptions of SAP was 
the phasing out of subsidies, an issue that has remained a bone of contention between the government and multi-lateral 
lending institutions for several years. This introduced new pressure regarding the question of petroleum products 
subsidies.  
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Until September 30, 1976, there was no increase in pump price of petrol  per litre in Nigeria (Ayoade, 2012). In line 
with SAP prescriptions, the price of petrol was changed on October 1, 1978 from 8.4/5 kobo to 15.30 kobo, an increase of 
73.86% (Elumide, Asaolu and Adereti, 2006). Reasons for the increment included to match galloping inflation, reduce 
cost of subsidizing fuel, cut cost of governance and reduce epicurean life. On April 20, 1982, the pump price was again 
increased from 15.30 kobo to 20 kobo per litre (Aghedo, 2012). 
During the Ibrahim Babangida administration, the price of petrol was increased five times.  On March 1, 1986, the 
price was increased from 20 kobo to 39.5 kobo, representing an 80% increase. Again on April 10, 1988, government 
increased the price of petrol per litre from 39.5 kobo to 42 kobo.  There was yet another increment on January 1, 1989 
when government increased the price from 42 kobo to 42/60 kobo (42 kobo for commercial vehicles and 60 kobo for 
private vehicles). On December 19, 1989, it was increased to 60 kobo across the board (Ayoade, 2012).In August, 1993, 
just few days before leaving office IBB’s military government announced that the price of petroleum products had been 
increased to #7 per litre.  This was however reversed by the Interim National Government (ING) as a carrot to gain 
legitimacy (Okogu, 1993).  
It was not long however, before the ING introduced its own price increases with fuel pump price moving from 70 
kobo to #5 per litre. The Abacha administration slashed the price to #3.25 per litre before increasing the price again to 
#15, representing 361.5% increase on October 2, 1994 (Ayoade, 2012). Due to widespread protests and labour action, 
the price was reviewed back to #11 per litre on October 4, 1994. 
The fuel pump price of #11 was retained until December 20, 1998, when General Abdulsalami Abubakar hiked the 
price from #11 to #15 per litre.  On January 6, 1999, the administration reviewed the price from #15 to #20. 
During the Civilian administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo, the price of petrol was increased six times. On 
June 1, 2000, fuel pump price was increased from #20 to #30 without consultation with the National Assembly, State 
Governors and the Nigerian Labour Congress (Aghedo, 2012). Due to agitations against the price increase, it was 
reviewed from #30 to #25 on June 8, 2000.  The price of #25 was however rejected by the organized labour, which led to 
a further reduction to #22 on June 13, 2000. 
Again, on January 1st, 2002, a new price of #26 per litre was introduced. The price was further reviewed upward to 
#40 per litre on June 23, 2003. In 2007, the price again skyrocketed to #70 per litre which was later reviewed downwards 
to #65 per litre. 
On January 1st, 2012, President Goodluck Jonathan announced that the price of fuel had been increased from #65 
to #140 per litre, representing about 115% increase.  This New year ‘gift’ led to the most serious outburst of public 
disenchantment in Nigeria since 2003 (Barret, 2012). 
 
Table 1: Fuel Pump Price Increases, Nigeria (1966-2012) 
 
Date Price per litre Regime Percentage Increased 
Between 1966 and 
September 30, 1976 8.4/5 kobo per litre 
Tafawa Balewa Aguiyi Ironsi, Yakubu 
Gowon and Murtala Mohammed  
October 1, 1978 15.30 kobo Olusegun Obasanjo 73.86% 
April 20, 1978 20 kobo Alhaji Shehu Shagari  
March 1, 1986 39.5 kobo Gen. Ibrahim Babangida 80% 
April 10, 1988 42 kobo ”  
Jan. 1, 1989 42 kobo for commercial vehicles and 80k for private vehicles ” 43.0% 
Dec. 19, 1989 60 kobo uniform price ” 43.0% 
March 6, 1991 70 kobo ” 16.6% 
Nov.8, 1993 #5.00 Chief Ernest Shonekan 614.0% 
Nov. 22, 1993 #3.25 Gen.Sani Abacha  
Oct. 2, 1994 #15.00 ” 361.5% 
Oct. 4, 1994 #11.00 ”  
Dec.20, 1998 #25.00 Gen. A. Abubakar 127.0% 
Jan. 6, 1999 #20.00 ”  
June 1, 2000 #30.00 Chief Olusegun Obasanjo  
June 8, 2000 #25.00 ”  
June 13, 2000 #22.00 ”  
Jan. 1, 2002 #26.00 ” 18.2% 
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June 20, 2003 #40.00 ” 53.0% 
July 9, 2003 #34.00 ”  
October 1, 2003 #38.50 and #42 ”  
May 29, 2004 #49.90 ”  
Jan. 2005 #50.50 ”  
August 2005 #70 ”  
January 2007 #65 Alhaji Umaru Yar’Adua 0.07% 
Jan. 1, 2012 #140 Goodluck Jonathan 117% 
January 2012 #97 ”  
 
Sources:  Ayoade (2012), Elumilade, Asaolu and Adereti (2006), Simon and Felix (2012), Atiri (2012). 
 
6. Fuel Subsidy Experiences in Some Sub-Saharan African States 
 
A number of developed and developing countries have engaged in fossil fuel subsidy policy reforms. These countries 
include Argentina, France, Brazil, China, Ghana, Senegal, Canada, France and India (World Bank, 2010). Prior to the 
year 2011, more than 25 African countries reportedly had one form of energy subsidy or another which consumed an 
average of 1.4 percent of GDP in Public Resources (Coady, et al., 2010:8). Of the 25 African countries with subsidies, the 
fiscal cost of subsidies in six of them, primarily oil exporters was at or above 2 percent of GDP in 2011 (Aghedo, 2012). 
According to the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD): 
Once in place fossil fuel subsidies are extremely difficult to remove. There is no single observed formula for 
success, country circumstances and changing global conditions are major contributory factors. However, strategies can 
be identified that contribute to successful reform and respond to individual country circumstances (IISD, 2008:8). 
The IISD (2008) identifies six important reform approaches; research; establishing reform objectives; building a 
coherent reform strategy; implementation; clear frames of progress and monitoring and evaluation. This logical process is 
expected to be followed before embarking on subsidy reform. 
The experiences of Ghana, Senegal, Angola, Cameroon, Mozambique, Guinea and others differ from Nigeria in 
terms of level of success/acceptance of fuel subsidy Reforms.  In Ghana, attempts at reforming fuel subsidy began in 
2001 in a collaborative effort with the IMF, as part of the latter’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility Programme. In 
February 2001, the Ghanaian government, in a bid to deregulate the sector, raised fuel prices by 91 percent and also 
introduced an automatic price setting mechanism by June of the same year (CCPA, 2012). 
The intent was to help revamp the State-owned Tema Oil Refinery (TOR) and pay off its mounting debts.  The 
exponential increase in pump price was however unsustainable due to the further increase in international oil prices. 
Accordingly, the new price mechanism had to be abandoned.  The Ghanaian government also made unsuccessful 
attempts to raise gasoline price in 2002 and 2003. It also set up the National Petroleum Authority (NPA) in 2005 which 
was charged with the responsibility of administering price. 
The Ghanaian case is reckoned as a substantial success because the government took important measures 
before the eventual removal of subsidy in 2011. This is perhaps why there was no dissent or opposition from the 
Ghananian people.  In Ghana, research was conducted to identify those most likely to be impacted by reform; “a 
communication strategy was employed to increase popular support; semi-independent and transparent institutions were 
established to manage fuel pricing; domestic prices were linked with international prices and policies were implemented 
to reduce impacts on the poor” (IISD, 2010:14).  
In Senegal, environmental concerns of deforestation prompted government to discourage the use of charcoal and 
firewood through the removal of import duties on Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) based cooking equipment in the 1970s. 
Given the successes recorded, the government decided to directly subsidize LPG in 1988.  By 1998 however, the burden 
of subsidy had become unbearable and on the advice of the IMF, the Senegalese Government planned a five year 
subsidy removal target running on 20 per cent withdrawal yearly until 2002 (CCPA, 2012).  
In 2009, the Senegalese government restated its commitment to removing subsidies which saw the increase in 
price of hitherto subsidized cylinders. The Senegalese experience showed that LPG subsidies were more beneficial to 
the rich who consumed more LPG.  The government also grappled with the problem of smuggling of subsidized LPG to 
neighbouring countries. The Senegalese case was also recorded as a relative success. The subsidy programme created 
strong incentives to switch from charcoal to LPG, which yielded environmental benefits (IISD, 2010). However, UNEP 
(2003) argues that because palliative measures for the poor were not properly articulated, rural populations could not 
switch to LPG because they could not afford it.  Unlike in Ghana, not much information and awareness-raising campaigns 
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were put in place before subsidy phase-out. 
In Guinea, measures were also introduced to reduce fossil fuel subsidy (Africa’s Pulse, 2012) with relative 
successes.  Like the Senegalese case, the Guinea experience revealed that urban households spend a larger share of 
their income in energy subsidies than rural households.  This logic has led many African states to embark on fuel subsidy 
removal in the belief that it will not impact greatly on rural livelihoods. Expenditure data from the Africa Region’s Survey-
Based Harmonization Indicators Programme (SHIP) for seven countries which included Guinea, showed that the mean 
share of total household direct expenditure on energy varied from around 1.90% (Ghana) to 4.2% (Sierra-Leone). 
Subsidy phase-out in Guinea did not meet with rejection perhaps because the people do not distrust their government. 
Mozambique also introduced a number of fuel price hikes in 2011 (10% in April and 8% in July), to bring prices to 
cost-recovery levels by early 2012. The intention was to ensure the unrestricted application of the price setting formula 
which will allow full pass through from changes in the world oil prices.  In Mozambique, as in Senegal and Guinea, these 
price hikes did not meet with widespread disenchantment or disapproval from the populace. 
The Nigerian case however, remains a paradox.  The simple fact that there is a great measure of distrust in 
government by the people makes any policy of subsidy removal hard to sell. While there is no doubt that savings will be 
made, the issues of contention remain the dismal performance of government over the years, in its duty in the provision 
of physical and social infrastructure. 
 
7. The Case for Subsidy Removal in Nigeria 
 
It is opined that developing countries, by and large, tend to be less energy-efficient than they could be, because of 
subsidies (Okogu, 1993). Even when rationalized principally on grounds of income distribution, it is noted that subsidies 
for fuel usually tend to favour the rich more than the poor because the former own more cars and use more fuel 
(Nwachukwu and Chike, 2011:1). In this wise, the NNPC (1993:3) avers that “the subsidy that would be beneficial would 
be in health care, mass transit and education”. 
Hotelling (1931) advocated the need to price fuel in a way that recognises its temporariness since a barrel of oil 
once lifted is gone forever and is no longer available for lifting at a future date. In this context, there should be a ‘user’ 
cost to compensate for the fact that future generations are permanently denied access to the same barrel. A consumption 
tax or subsidy phase-out could prove useful in making up for this by releasing resources with which to transform the 
economy. Because oil and fossil fuels have a limited lifespan, they fall into a category known as exhaustible resources. In 
this vein Akhaine (2010:90) notes that: 
As for Nigeria, its proven reserves are estimated at 40 billion barrels. This figure could be augmented by new 
offshore findings. At the rate of 2.5 million barrels per day, the life index of the oil can be put at about 43 years.  This 
merely brings home the fact that oil is finite and that the well will soon dry up. 
The common argument advanced for having subsidy for fuel in Nigeria is that it is endowed with huge oil reserves 
and thus, making energy cheap could enhance economic growth and protect the populace from needless hardships 
arising from exhorbitant prices. This is nevertheless untenable, as nothing is passed on to future generations.  
Accordingly, the best way to ensure continuity and inter-generational equity is to exploit the resource optimally and use 
proceeds from it to transform the economy so that long after the point of reserve-exhaustion, the society can continue to 
be self sustaining (Solow, 1986; Hartwick, 1977). 
It is ridiculous to expect the nation to invest heavily in oil production only for just recovering the cost of production 
at the end of the day. According to Soyode (2001:55), “the cost of producing crude is irrelevant in the calculation of fuel 
subsidy”. Further, he describes fuel subsidy as the loss of revenue that should have accrued to the federation account 
were the crude oil allocated for domestic consumption sold at international market prices, rather than at the price for 
which it is sold to the NNPC. 
It is further argued that the importance of appropriately pricing fuel is underlined by the fact that firstly, it provides 
arbitrage opportunity for marketers who buy cheaply at home and sell exhorbitantly at the border.  Thus, it is generally 
accepted that rational-energy pricing (avoidance of subsidies) constitutes the most viable long-term options for bringing 
about efficiency because low domestic prices work against efficiency improvements (Okogu, 1993). 
It is also averred that there is a sense in which the existence of subsidy accentuates the activities of smugglers. 
The Neighbouring countries of Chad and Cameroon have much higher prices than Nigeria, a scenario which has 
increased smuggling activities across the border with these countries. Moreover, the National Treasury is allegedly 
denied funds amounting to the level of the implied subsidy, part of which appears in the form of huge profits for smugglers 
(Akhaine, 2010). 
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The classical argument for having a subsidy, relates to the need for accelerated development and to improve 
income distribution. However, the income distribution argument is faulted on grounds that petroleum subsidies are biased 
in favour of the urban sector.  It is not surprising therefore that it has been concluded that fuel subsidy policy benefits the 
rich more than the poor (Kosmo, 1989). Accordingly, the diversion of scarce resources from other deserving sectors such 
as education and health, in the name of fuel subsidy is believed to exacerbate inequality and poverty.  
 
8. The Case against Subsidy Phase-out 
 
There is a very sound basis for periodically raising domestic fuel prices in Nigeria.  Even the most die-hard skeptics would 
agree with the logic of such a policy. Nonetheless, there are a number of factors that have been responsible for the 
resistance of a subsidy phase-out. To begin with, there is a genuine concern that the burden of adjustment will not be 
borne evenly, and that the middle/lower income groups would bear the most of it. This is illustrated by the assertion of 
Lamido Sanusi Lamido, Former Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), who stated that he could not remember 
when last he paid for fuel from his pocket (Saturday Sun, 2012). 
Ngozi Okonjo Iweala, Nigeria’s Finance Minister and Coordinating Minister of the Economy, was also quoted as 
saying that fuel pump Price increment will affect only a small fraction of Nigerians because 70% of Nigerians trek 
(Saturday Sun, 2012). However, as noted by Barret (2012), the increase in fuel pump price will have a debilitating effect 
on all Nigerians. Comrade Abdulwaheed Omar, Nigeria’s Labour President also said in an interview that any fuel price 
increase is definitely bound to affect the generality of Nigerians, as the cost of food, transport, and education would 
skyrocket (Simon and Felix, 2012). 
Futhermore, it is held that the idea of subsidy removal is inextricably tied to economic adjustment programmes like 
SAP, which has brought fundamental changes to the Nigerian economy and society.  The idea behind SAP is that scarce 
natural resources like foreign currency or energy would be allocated more efficiently, so as to increase the overall 
productive efficiency of the economy.  But then, the implementation of SAP which is the prerequisite for Nigeria’s 
integration into the global capitalist system has resulted in the worsening of the development crises in Nigeria (Otoghile 
and Akov, 2011). 
Moreso, while the financial sector has done very well largely because the gap between the official and parallel 
market exchange rates creates lucrative arbitrage opportunities for them, the real sector of the economy has stagnated or 
even declined.  The continuing decline in the Naira exchange rate is a direct reflection of the gap between the two 
sectors, and the concomittant growth in money supplies.  These relates to fuel subsidy in that domestic prices will 
continue to be evaluated on the basis of the exchange rate which has become like a moving target (Okogu, 1993). In this 
sense, the recent price increases already appear low when converted on the basis of the prevailing parallel exchange 
rate, which appears to deteriorate further. Clearly, the problem of fuel subsidy is inescapably tied to the success or failure 
of SAP in stabilizing the economy. 
In the official rhetoric of the Nigerian government, one of the major reasons for removing subsidy for fuel is to 
curtail smuggling. Nevertheless, it is opined that the chain of cross-border smuggling, by its very nature, must involve oil 
marketers, truck drivers, the customs, police, immigration and other security officials.  Moreover, oil trucks are large, 
easily recognizable entities that must pass through trunk roads and move through manned borders in order to pass 
through. Thus, the fact that smuggling persists is suggestive that smuggling activities have the support of top government 
functionaries (Nwachukwu and Chike, 2012). 
High cost of governance is identified as an important corollary for explaining the blanket opposition against fuel 
subsidy removal (Oshunkeye, 2012). In the wake of fuel subsidy removal, Nigeria’s President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, 
announced a 25% basic salary pay cut for political office holders. He also commissioned 1,600 buses for urban 
transportation. However, many believe that the reduction in basic salaries of public officials is just symbolic and amounts 
to little. According to Barret (2012:15): 
At a point when costs are bound to rise, to simply slash emoluments of workers no matter whether they are aides 
to the President or not sends a wrong signal to the populace.  It suggests that these appointees have either been 
enjoying totally disproportionate economic benefits so far, or that they will be immunized against the impending economic 
hardships by special privileges that will replace their withdrawn financial benefits.  
An estimated 17,500 officials constituting only 0.015 percent (less than a quarter of a percent) of Nigeria’s 
estimated 150 million people, reportedly earn more than a quarter of the country’s annual national budget (Oshunkeye, 
2012). As at 2010, the Revenue Mobilization, Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC), revealed that 17,474 political 
office holders were earning #1.12 trillion yearly and of the #1.12 trillion, salaries reportedly gulped about 
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#94,959,545,401.20 billion while #1,031,654,689,033.18 trillion went to allowances annually (Oshunkeye, 2012). Simple 
arithmetics would show that salaries took less than 10 percent of the allowances; suggesting that despite the cut in basic 
salaries, the figures as processed by RMAFC would still be staggering.  
The above developments have led many commentators and analysists to come to the conclusion that the 
government is insensitive to the plight of her citizens (Aghedo, 2012); Adegboye, 2012). Under normal circumstances, 
government is expected to fix the country’s refineries, which ideally should be producing optimally, before embarking on 
any policy of subsidy removal (Martins, 2012). Government’s inability or unwillingness to revamp the country’s moribund 
refineries is suggestive that top government functionaries are implicated in the rot and shady deals in the oil sector 
(Bamisoye and Obiyan, 2006). 
Accordingly, fuel subsidy removal has come to symbolize not a quest for efficiency, but all that is bad in 
government; intrigue, corruption, distrust, profligacy, anti-democracy and so on.  Moreover, unlike in Ghana, the Nigerian 
government failed to put in place measures to cushion the harsh impacts of increased prices for fuel, thus failing to 
alleviate the sufferings of the majority of the citizenry.  It is littled wonder therefore, that there was such a blanket 
opposition to subsidy removal, not because Nigerians did not see the economic rationale for it, but because they distrust 
their government, which has over the past years subjected her citizenry to all kinds of sacrifices, which did not as much 
as improve their living conditions. 
 
9. Corruption in Nigeria’s Oil Sector: An Analysis 
 
Over the past decades, the fuel subsidy patchwork has been plagued by crimimally ochestrated tendencies of oil 
marketers and other sharp practices in the distribution of import allocations, approval of subsidy payments and actual 
release of subsidy cheques. Over 25 oil importers have been penciled down to face criminal investigations for one kind of 
fuel subsidy infraction or another (Eni, 2012). In 2010 alone, fuel subsidy cost Nigeria #600 billion and in the first eight 
months of 2011, it reportedly gulped #1.426 billion in public funds. The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
stipulated that every litre of fuel sold in Nigeria was subsidized with about #77 to ensure compliance with the official pump 
price of #65 across the country. This amounted to #3.655 trillion paid to petroleum importers between 2006 and 2011 
(Eni, 2012). 
According to Sahara Reporters (2011), Oando oil owned by Wale Tinubu, Conoil owned by Mike Adenuga, African 
Petroleum owned by Femi Otedola, MRS Oil owned by Aliko Dangote’s brother, Sayyu Dantata and integrated oil owned 
by former Minister of Interior, Captain Emmanuel Iheanacho, are among the powerful players in the petroleum sector that 
have shared #3.655 trillion between 2006 and 2011 in the guise of importing refined petroleum products. Senator Magnus 
Ibe, the then Chairman Senate Committee on Petroleum (Down Stream), disclosed that several companies involved in 
the down stream sector and construction, shared over #1.426 trillion between January and August 2011 alone. 
 
Table 2:  List of some companies implicated in fuel subsidy infractions 
 
S/N Company Infraction Description Amount (#) 
1. Aluminnur Resources Ltd. Subsidy vessels for which mother vessels were no longer operational; No shipping documents. 1,051,030,434.64 
2. Brula Energy Ltd. Subsidy payments for which mother vessels were not found in location claimed at the time of transhipment. 963,796,199.85 
3. Caades Oil and Gas Ltd. No evidence of sales proceeds in banks. 487,799,826.80 
4. Capital Oil and Gas Ltd. Subsidy payments for which mother vessels were not found in location claimed. 8,898,180,238.91 
5. Capital Oil Plc Subsidy payments for which mother vessels were not found. 1,216,298,517.20 
6. Ceoti Ltd No evidence of sales proceeds in banks. 1,773,421,842.01 
7. Conoil Plc Subsidy payments without proof of mother vessels bill of lading or daughter vessel bill of lading. 2,948,078,077.90 
8. Downstream Energy Ltd. Subsidy payments for which mother vessels were not found. 1,774,089,040.63 
9. Eterna Plc No evidence of sales proceeds in banks; no proof of existence of mother/daughter bill of lading. 2,122,859,123.70 
10. Eurafic Oil and Gas Ltd. Subsidy payments for which mother vessels were not found. 2,261,859,123.70 
11. Heyden Petroleum Subsidy payments for which mother vessels were not found. 594,716,089.31 
12. Lumen Skies Ltd. Transactions disclaimed by banks. 774,787,752.86 
13. Majore Investment Ltd. Subsidy payments without authorized signatures. 959,813,734.22 
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14. Master Energy Oil and Gas Ltd. Subsidy payments for which mother vessels were not found. 2,908,996,291.29 
15. Matrix Energy Ltd. Subsidy payments for which mother vessels were not found; no shipping document evidencing payment. 
 
6,233,502,137.15 
16. Menol Oil and Gas Ltd. Subsidy payments for which mother vessels were not found. 1,691,595,830.87 
17. Mob International Services No evidence of sales proceeds from banks. 2,137,328,914.10 
18. MRS Oil and Gas Plc. No shipping documents evidencing payment. 6,086,531,305.33 
19. Nasaman Oil Services Ltd. Subsidy payments for which vessels were not found; no authorised signature/evidence of sales proceeds from banks. 3,081,370,678.34 
20. Naticel Petroleum Ltd. No evidence of sales proceeds in banks. 3,081,370,678.34 
21. Ocean Energy Trading and Services Ltd. Payments for which vessels were not found. 1,778,180,051.20 
22. Pinnacle Contractor Ltd. Payments for which vessels were not found. 2,755,646,744.04 
23. Sifax Oil and Gas Company Payments for which vessels were no longer operational. 1,033,119,489.60 
24. Tonque Oil Services No evidence of sales proceeds in banks. 1,575,014,046.51 
25. Top Oil and Gas Development Company Ltd. 
Payments for which vessels were not found; no shipping documents were 
signed. 2,360,733,485.43 
 
Source:  The Nation (2012:2). 
 
Besides the companies listed in the table above, numerous other oil companies received over #1 trillion in fuel subsidy 
payments (Sahara Reporters, 2011). Given these discoveries, there is a growing consciousness and realization among 
the articulate citizenry that the corrupt elite have no plan for the future. It is clear therefore that fuel subsidy, basically 
benefitted rich cabals, including MNOCs that are not interested in building refineries (Aghedo, 2012). 
The fuel subsidy scandal opened the pandoras box on profligate practices in the country’s troubled oil sector.  
Lawan Farouk, erstwhile Chairman of the House of Representatives Committee set up to investigate fuel subsidy 
corruption, was implicated in a $620,000 bribery saga. It was alleged that there was a taped conversation between Lawan 
Farouk and oil magnate, Femi Otedola, in which both parties negotiated the payment of the said bribe money to Farouk. 
The intent was to doctor the fuel subsidy Report and absolve Otedola’s company from any wrongdoing (Oderemi, 2012).it 
is regrettable that despite glaring evidence of the purported bribery incident, the government is yet to prosecute the 
suspects and bring them to justice. 
Thus, if this quantum of misappropriation and corruption has been committed by marketers, individuals and 
institutions of government, what is the guarantee that the funds which would become available on account of fuel subsidy 
removal will be used to develop infrastructure, alleviate poverty, generate employment and provide social services? 
These elements (the ruling elite) have been largely responsible for the mind-bogging corruption and low economic 




This paper has ostensibly alluded to the issue of an appropriate product pricing for fuel in Nigeria.  Clearly, the discovery 
of oil has in a précis, had both positive and negative implications for Nigeria’s economy and society.  While it is admitted 
that its discovery has led to marginal improvements in the country’s infrastructure, the gains have been negligible when 
compared to the losses (Yusufu, 2005). Moreover, much of the oil-generated wealth has ended up in the hands of a few 
individuals (the ruling class), while a substantial chunk has appeared as profits for smugglers. Accordingly, majority of 
Nigerians continue to wallow in abject poverty in the face of stupendous oil-generated opulence. 
The institution of a fuel subsidy regime, with the intent to cushion the effect of high prices for petroleum products 
on poor and vulnerable groups, has not steadied Nigeria’s sinking economic ship. This is largely because of the corrupt 
activities of the “oil cabal” charged with the importation of fuel. Further, smugglers in collaboration with big oil merchants 
have illegally smuggled subsidized fuel to neighbouring African countries for sale at international prices, thereby 
engendering scarcity at home. Oil marketers have together mismanaged over $6 billion of Nigeria’s oil revenue in the 
past few years (Okogu, 1993; Aghedo, 2012). 
The removal of subsidy, ostensibly to halt the activities of corrupt oil marketers/smugglers and make money 
available for infrastructural development appears to have worsened the economic conditions of Nigerians, particularly the 
poor. With the removal of fuel subsidy comes indiscriminate and exponential surge in fuel pump prices, along with 
increases in the cost of food, rent, and transport and so on.  Moreover, unlike in Ghana, imperative measures were not 
put in place to cushion the harsh effects of fuel subsidy phase-out on poor and vulnerable groups before embarking on 
E-ISSN 2281-4612 
ISSN 2281-3993        
Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies
MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy 
                                   Vol 4 No 1 
                            March 2015 
 
 404
the policy which has led to resistance and protests.  
In Nigeria, increases in fuel pump prices have historically dovetailed with promises for economic reconstruction 
since the 1970s (Okogu, 1993). However, the sacrifices made hardly ever yield considerable benefits. This development 
has ruptured the social contract between the people and the government, which has led to the former’s distrust for the 
latter’s institutions and programmes. 
 
11. Recommendations  
 
There is no gainsaying that the current fuel pricing arrangement (retention of fuel subsidy) is not sustainable from a long-
term point of view, given the exhaustible nature of oil and because the sector’s infrastructure needs continuous 
modernization and or expansion. However, it is not practical, or even appropriate to raise domestic prices to world levels 
because the current average income level in Nigeria cannot sustain such an increase.  Thus, the real wages of workers 
should be reviewed upwards to enable them cope with harsh economic conditions occasioned by increased fuel pump 
prices. 
It is needless to state that corruption and criminality in Nigeria’s oil sector are the major causes of poverty and 
underdevelopment in the country. The inability or refusal of successive governments to stem the activities of the corrupt 
cabal in the oil sector and prosecute oil thieves has conveyed the impression to the public of a government which is not 
committed to fighting corruption and addressing the country’s infrastructural deficits.  It is expedient to re-dedicate and 
reorganize Nigeria’s anti-corruption architecture, so as to make it more proactive in the prosecution of those found 
culpable of corruption. This would enhance transparency and accountability, and in turn increase people’s trust for 
government and its policies. 
Government must as a matter of urgency, fast-track the turn-around maintenance of the country’s refineries and 
encourage the building of new ones. This would address the overdependence on importation of refined petroleum 
products and protect Nigeria’s economy from the volatility of global oil prices.  In this regard, government should partner 
with the major oil companies such as Chevron, Shell Bp, Exxon Mobil, Total and other stakeholders in the sector to build 
refineries in the country. This would greatly reduce the activities of smugglers and other oil criminals, and thus conserve 
foreign exchange. The initiation and implementation of power sector reform programmes would go a long way in reducing 
reliance on petroleum products as principal sources of energy in the country. It is also necessary to put in place an 
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